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PREEMPTION OF STATE
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Preemption is the constitutional doctrine which holds that when
federal law and state law conflict, federal law must be followed,
and state law must yield. In Alaska, the wildlife law known as the
Intensive Management statute is in conflict with federal laws
governing national park lands and the management of wildlife on
those lands. Preemption requires the State of Alaska to refrain
from implementing the Intensive Management statute on national
park lands because of the conflict with federal laws. This Article
describes the relevant state and federal laws, the preemption
doctrine, and the doctrine’s application to wildlife management
in Alaska. It concludes by stating that Alaska has every right to
manage wildlife as it sees fit but must always yield in cases where
its laws are preempted by the laws of the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1994, the State of Alaska has been managing wildlife in
accordance with the state’s Intensive Management principles laid
1
out in the Alaska Code. This statute—which will be referred to as
the Intensive Management statute—directly conflicts with the
wildlife management mandates laid out by Congress in the
2
National Park Service Organic Act and the Alaska National
3
Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA). This direct conflict
is currently preventing the National Park Service (NPS) from
4
achieving the goals set out for it by Congress. As the State’s
implementation of the Intensive Management statute becomes
increasingly widespread, it is ever more important for the National
Park Service to recognize that the State’s current Intensive
Management program is preempted on NPS lands based on a
theory of direct conflict. The stark differences in the animating
legislation of the State and the NPS have led to misunderstandings
between both the hunting and conservation communities and the
management agencies themselves. This Article seeks to explain
why the NPS may not acquiesce to wildlife management practices
1. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2006).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2000).
4. Currently, the Intensive Management statute only directly affects national
preserve lands, since state hunting regulations have been superseded by ANILCA
§§ 816(a) and 1314(c) since 1989. For many years the State has informed the
public that the State’s regulations do not apply to national parks and national
monuments. See ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH & GAME, 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING
REGULATIONS 80–88 (2007), available at http://www.wildlife.alaska.gov/
regulations/pdfs/regulations_complete.pdf [hereinafter 2007–2008 ALASKA
HUNTING REGULATIONS]; see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1983) (prohibiting hunting of
wildlife or fishing except as otherwise provided in the chapter). This, however,
could easily affect all NPS lands because the Federal Subsistence Board, which
establishes the hunting regulations for parks and monuments, is pressured to
adopt the State’s hunting regulations, and because the State hopes to eventually
reclaim control of all hunting in Alaska. See generally Master Memorandum of
Understanding Between the Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Juneau,
Alaska, and the U.S. National Park Service, Department of the Interior,
Anchorage, Alaska (Oct. 14, 1982) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]
(on file with author); see also Letter from Governor Frank Murkowski to
Secretary Gale Norton (Jan. 10, 2005) (on file with author) (pressuring the federal
subsistence board to defer to State hunting regulations).
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that conflict with its mandate and how the Intensive Management
statute does, in fact, conflict with that mandate.
Part II of this article outlines the federal mandates for the
management of wildlife on NPS lands in Alaska. Part III describes
Alaska’s Intensive Management statute and the regulations derived
from it. Part IV defines the theory of preemption as a result of
direct conflict, and Part V describes how the criteria for
preemption of state law, based on a theory of direct conflict, are
met by the facts in this situation.
II. WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AND THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
The NPS is guided in its efforts to manage wildlife on its lands
by its enabling statute, the 1916 National Park Service Organic Act,
and its most recent interpretation of this statute—which was most
recently stated in the 2006 Management Policies. The agency is
also guided by the legislation creating each park unit—which often
carries more specific instructions regarding Congress’s intentions
for the different land areas.
The Organic Act tells the agency to “conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
5
generations.” Over the years, courts have interpreted this
somewhat vague statement to mean that the agency has broad
discretion in making resource use decisions and in determining the
6
With
proper balance between preservation and enjoyment.
wildlife in particular, the agency initially applied this statutory
7
language inconsistently, sometimes emphasizing preservation and
8
at other times highlighting use and enjoyment.

5. 16 U.S.C. § 1.
6. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1247 (E.D. Cal. 1999)
(“[T]he Organic Act does not serve as basis for a cause of action when the issue is
confined to the Agency’s exercise of discretion in attempting to balance valid,
competing values.”); see also National Wildlife Federation v. NPS, 669 F. Supp.
384, 391 (D. Wyo. 1987) (“[T]he Park Service has broad discretion in determining
which avenues best achieve the Organic Act’s mandate.”).
7. An early directive from the Secretary of the Interior to the first director of
the National Park Service read: “[H]unting will not be permitted in any national
park.” Nat’l Rifle Assoc. v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D.D.C. 1986).
8. In the early years of the Park Service, “the Service’s desire to maintain
peaceful scenes led it to exterminate animals . . . . Predators such as cougars,
wolves, coyotes, lynx, bobcats, foxes, badgers, mink, weasels, fishers, otters, and
martens were unnatural impairments to the natural grandeur that the Service
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In 1978, Congress amended the NPS’s responsibilities with the
Redwood National Park Expansion Act,9 which states in part that:
Congress further reaffirms, declares, and directs that the
promotion and regulation of the various areas of the National
Park System . . . shall be consistent with and founded in the
purpose established by the first section of the Act of August 25,
1916, to the common benefit of all the people of the United
States. The authorization of activities shall be construed and the
protection, management, and administration of these areas shall
be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the
National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of
the values and purposes for which these various areas have been
established, except as may have been or shall be directly and
10
specifically provided by Congress.

This statement reaffirms and strengthens Congress’s earlier
pronouncement on the NPS’s duties, because it requires that the
agency’s actions be consistent with the conservation purpose of the
11
parks.
In the late 1960s, the NPS also began implementing less
intrusive techniques for the management of wildlife. This policy—
which has come to be called natural regulation—“relies on
ecological processes to determine, or regulate, population
12
conditions of native plants and animals to the extent practicable.”
Under a natural regulation regime, “[w]ildlife populations are
13
allowed to fluctuate without direct human intervention.” The
agency’s policy, by the 1980s, “had evolved to emphasize
maintenance of natural ecological processes as a means of
managing native wildlife. The tradition of nonintervention in
wildlife dynamics in U.S. national parks is an outgrowth of this
14
This approach was formalized in a series of
policy . . . .”
Management Policies, with the latest being Management Policies
15
2006. In this document, NPS managers are told to “adopt park
sought to ‘leave unimpaired.’” DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE,
WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1063 (2002).
9. 92 Stat. 166 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a–1 (2000)).
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 910 (finding that the Redwood National Park
Expansion Act furthers the purpose of conservation in the Organic Act).
12. Michael Soukup, Mary K. Foley, Ronald Hiebert & Dan E. Huff, Wildlife
Management in U.S. National Parks: Natural Regulation Revisited, 9 ECOLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 1 (1999).
13. Rolf O. Peterson, Wolf-Moose Interaction on Isle Royale: The End of
Natural Regulation?, 9 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 10 (1999).
14. Id. at 10–11.
15. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
MANAGEMENT
POLICIES
2006
(December
2000),
available
at
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resource preservation, development, and use management
strategies that are intended to maintain the natural population
fluctuations and processes that influence the dynamics of individual
plant and animal populations, groups of plants and animal
16
populations, and migratory animal populations.” Therefore, the
NPS’s current policy is generally to avoid interfering with
population dynamics.
Only under unusual circumstances is the natural regulation
rule set aside for a more active management approach. For
instance, the NPS may remove wildlife from parks where the
agency determines that such removal is necessary for the
17
protection of park resources. In general, the Organic Act requires
a finding of “detriment” before the NPS may destroy park wildlife:
“The Secretary of the Interior . . . may also provide in his discretion
for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be
detrimental to the use of any of said parks, monuments, or
18
There is also an NPS policy that requires “an
reservations.”
explicit finding of detriment by a park superintendent when a
controlled harvest program is contemplated, i.e., a program
designed to kill a percentage of a herd [or population] for no other
reason than the desire to reduce the size of the herd [or
19
So, while artificial manipulation of wildlife
population].”

http://www.nps.gov/policy/MP2006.pdf [hereinafter MANAGEMENT POLICIES
2006].
16. Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
17. See Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (approving the Park
Service’s authority to remove deer that the Service determined were harming a
National Historic Site).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 3 (2000).
19. Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435, 1441 (D.
Mont. 1996), aff’d mem., 108 F.3d 1385 (9th Cir. 1997); see also 48 F.R. 30252 § 2.2
(1983) (“In units of the National Park System where hunting and trapping
activities are not authorized by enabling legislation for a park area, resource
management for purposes of wildlife use and control is accomplished only
pursuant to the authority of 16 U.S.C. 3, which authorizes the reduction of animal
populations determined to be ‘detrimental’ to the use of the area and its statutory
values.”). See also MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 44 (“Whenever
the Service removes plants or animals, manages plant or animal populations to
reduce their sizes, or allows others to remove plants or animals for an authorized
purpose, the Service will seek to ensure that such removals will not cause
unacceptable impacts to [sic] native resources, natural processes, or other park
resources. Whenever the Service identifies a possible need for reducing the size of
a park plant or animal population, the Service will use scientifically valid resource
information obtained through consultation with technical experts, literature
review, inventory, monitoring, or research to evaluate the identified need for
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populations is permissible, the circumstances under which the NPS
can take such action are quite narrow, and the NPS must first make
its case for choosing to do so.
The NPS has a long history of court-supported preemption of
state wildlife laws where those laws conflict with the NPS’s mission
20
or regulations. In New Mexico State Game Commission v. Udall,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the NPS had the
authority to remove deer from Carlsbad Caverns National Park for
research purposes without seeking a permit from the state as
21
required under New Mexico state law. The court added that if the
State felt that the law gave too much authority to the NPS, the
remedy was not with the courts since the law is valid and there was
22
no abuse of the discretion it created. Similarly, in United States v.
Moore, the West Virginia Southern District Court, citing New
Mexico State Game Commission, stated that “the power of the
United States to regulate and protect wildlife living on the
23
federally controlled property cannot be questioned.” In that case,
the court found that the NPS had the authority to prevent the state
from spraying pesticides to eliminate black flies in the New River
Gorge National River because the NPS’s regulations prohibited the
taking of wildlife—including black flies. A final example can be
found in United States v. Brown, where the State of Minnesota
wanted to assert the dominance of state hunting laws on waters
24
adjacent to and surrounded by Voyageurs National Park. Here,
the court stated bluntly that “[w]here the State’s laws conflict with
the . . . regulations of the National Park Service . . . the local laws
population management [and] document it in the appropriate park management
plan.”).
20. “Because the NPS Organic Act does not defer to state wildlife law, the
Park Service is not constrained by that law.” ROBERT L. GLICKMAN & GEORGE
CAMERON COGGINS, MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW 260 (2001). See also R. Gerald
Wright, Wildlife Management in National Parks: Questions in Search of Answers, 9
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 30, 32 (1999) (“From its beginning, the NPS has
maintained exclusive jurisdiction over the management of wildlife in parks. And,
although legally contested by individual state game departments, court decisions
have uniformly supported the right of the NPS to own and manage wildlife on its
lands.”).
21. 410 F.2d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 1969).
22. Id. at 1202.
23. 640 F. Supp. 164, 166 (S.D. W. Va. 1986); see also Organized Fishermen of
Fla. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 1351, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (“[T]here is no question
that the complete power Congress has over public lands under the Property
Clause of the Constitution . . . necessarily includes the power to regulate and
protect the wildlife living there.”).
24. 431 F. Supp. 56, 59 (D. Minn. 1976).
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must recede.”25 It is clear that the NPS has the authority to
regulate activities in park areas even where these regulations
conflict with state regulations.
As stated above, the Organic Act provides important general
guidelines for park management, but it is the specific park
establishment acts that provide the details for management. Since
the management of wildlife within a park depends on Congress’s
statements at the time the land was set aside, it is important to
examine the relevant establishment legislation. ANILCA created
26
or expanded nearly every park in Alaska and continues to be
Congress’s most detailed statement as to the proper management
of Alaska’s parks. That Act makes it lawful to take wildlife for
subsistence purposes from most parks and all preserves in Alaska
27
ANILCA also
and for sport hunting purposes in preserves.
provides guidelines for situations in which wildlife population
numbers falter. The statute makes it clear that in such cases,
subsistence hunting is to be given priority over sport hunting where
the two compete for wildlife resources; and where the elimination
28
of sport hunting is inadequate, the Federal Subsistence Board is to
29
decrease even subsistence use of animal resources. But, in all of
these detailed instructions provided by Congress, there is no
mention of any type of intensive management of wildlife resources
as a solution to such a situation. This suggests that Congress
deliberately excluded intensive management practices from the
NPS’s arsenal under such circumstances.
ANILCA never
contemplates the use of intensive wildlife management techniques
as a means of sustaining the hunting systems. Instead, the statute
makes clear that hunting must give way where necessary.
ANILCA’s wildlife management mandate can be found in
several sections of the statute and can be summed up as a
requirement to conserve natural and healthy populations of
wildlife. ANILCA states:

25. Id. at 63; see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 (1976) (holding
that the argument that Congress lacks power to administer public lands contrary
to state law without state consent is “without merit”).
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101–3233 (2000).
27. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3126(a), 3202(c)(1) (2000).
28. “Federal subsistence management falls under the authority of the federal
subsistence board. The board [is compromised of] the Alaska regional directors
of the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the
Bureau of Land Management, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as well as the
chair appointed by the Secretary of the Interior.” DAVID CASE & DAVID
VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS 302 (2002).
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126(b) (2000).
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It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress that . . .
consistent with sound management principles, and the
conservation of healthy populations of fish and wildlife, the
utilization of the public lands in Alaska is to cause the least
adverse impact possible on rural residents who 30depend upon
subsistence uses of the resources of such lands . . . .

ANILCA also provides that:
Nothing in this title shall be construed as . . . granting any
property right in any fish or wildlife or other resource of the
public lands or as permitting the level of subsistence uses of fish
and wildlife within a conservation system unit to be inconsistent
with the conservation of healthy populations, and within a
national park or monument to be inconsistent with the
conservation
of natural and healthy populations, of fish and
31
wildlife.

This strong statement clearly indicates that hunting—even
subsistence hunting—must never interfere with the maintenance of
natural, healthy populations. Intensive management techniques
that are designed to artificially inflate prey numbers by removing
native predators, or by other intrusive and disruptive means, would
not be consistent with the common understanding of the
conservation of natural and healthy populations.
The legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress
took this requirement very seriously. The Senate Report on
ANILCA states: “The committee intends the phrase ‘the
conservation of healthy populations of fish and wildlife’ to mean
the maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats in
a condition which assures stable and continuing natural populations
and species mix of plants and animals in relation to their
32
ecosystems . . . .” The report goes on to state that:
The Committee recognizes that the management policies and
legal authorities of the National Park System and the National
Wildlife Refuge System may require different interpretations
and application of the ‘healthy population’ concept consistent
with the management objectives of each system. Accordingly,
the Committee recognizes that the policies and legal authorities
of the managing agencies will determine the nature and degree
of management programs affecting ecological relationships,
population dynamics,
and manipulation of the components of
33
the ecosystem.

30. Id. at § 3112(1) (emphasis added).
31. Id. at § 3125(1) (emphasis added).
32. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070,
5177 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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The Senate Report clearly indicates that Congress not only
intended the Bureau of Land Management, the Forest Service, the
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service to manage
the wildlife on their lands for healthy populations, but that
Congress also recognized the NPS’s (and the Fish and Wildlife
Service’s) more rigorous existing wildlife management mandates as
the appropriate source for the guidance of agency action. The
Department of the Interior took this explanation to heart and
incorporated it, nearly verbatim, into its regulations interpreting
and implementing the “conservation of healthy populations of fish
34
and wildlife” language of ANILCA for purposes of subsistence.
Of course, both the Organic Act and ANILCA encourage the
35
NPS to cooperate with state and local agencies, but such
cooperation does not authorize variance from statutory directives;
ANILCA is explicit on this point. Section 802(3) of ANILCA
states:
[E]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act or other Federal laws,
Federal land managing agencies, in managing subsistence
activities on the public lands and in protecting the continued
viability of wild renewable resources in Alaska, shall cooperate
with adjacent landowners and land managers, including Native
Corporations,
appropriate State and Federal agencies, and other
36
nations.

Congress did not authorize the NPS to cooperate with state law to
37
the point of sacrificing the mandates expressed in ANILCA itself.

34. 50 C.F.R. § 100.4 (1992) (“Conservation of healthy populations of fish and
wildlife means the maintenance of fish and wildlife resources and their habitats in
a condition that assures stable and continuing natural populations and species mix
of plants and animals in relation to their ecosystem . . . and recognizes that the
policies and legal authorities of the managing agencies will determine the nature
and degree of management programs affecting ecological relationships,
population dynamics, and the manipulation of the components of the ecosystem.”)
(emphasis added).
35. See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(c) (2000) (“The Secretary of the Interior is hereby
authorized to . . . cooperate, within the National Park System, with any State or
political subdivision thereof in the enforcement of supervision of the laws or
ordinances of that State or subdivision.”). Here again, the Secretary is authorized,
but not required, to cooperate; such cooperation would not justify a violation of
the precepts of the statute itself. See also 16 U.S.C. § 3112(3).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 3112(3).
37. “The NPS and the states should work as harmoniously as possible,
particularly in a park where Congress has authorized hunting under state law.
However, the NPS need not feign that it possesses no authority or responsibility
over the wild animals within park boundaries.” Frank Buono, Managing Wildlife
in the Parks: The Legal Basis, 14 THE GEORGE WRIGHT FORUM 18, 23 (1997).
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Finally, ANILCA contains a savings clause preserving state
authority over wildlife management: “Nothing in this Act is
intended to enlarge or diminish the responsibility and authority of
the State of Alaska for management of fish and wildlife on the
public lands except as may be provided in Title VIII of this Act, or
38
to amend the Alaska constitution.” But while state authority in
general is unchanged, the clause itself notes that Title VIII of the
statute, which creates the federal subsistence priority and lays out
the management mandate described above, takes precedence.
Lending too much weight to the preservation of authority portion
of this clause would nullify the management mandates provided
elsewhere in the statute, as well as the rest of the language of the
savings clause itself. It seems, therefore, that what the savings
clause is actually preserving to the State is its pre-existing role—
also preserved under the Organic Act—to generally manage
wildlife. The Organic Act authorizes the NPS to manage park
areas, and where that management conflicts with state law, state
law must give way.
III. STATE INTENSIVE MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE
In 1994, the Alaska State Legislature amended the existing
statute directing the State Board of Game on wildlife
39
The amended statute calls for “intensive
management.
management” of wildlife populations in place of the earlier
40
approach to wildlife management. The explicit goal of the State’s
Intensive Management statute is to maintain, restore, or increase
the abundance of big game prey populations for human
41
consumptive use. Where current prey population levels are not
38. 16 U.S.C. § 3202 (2000) (emphasis added).
39. Act of Apr. 12, 1994, ch. 13, 1994 Alaska Sess. Laws § 2.
40. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255 (2006).
41. Section 16.05.255(e) reads as follows:
The Board of Game shall adopt regulations to provide for intensive
management programs to restore the abundance or productivity of
identified big game prey populations as necessary to achieve human
consumptive use goals of the board in an area where the board has
determined that
(1) consumptive use of the big game prey population is a preferred
use;
(2) depletion of the big game prey population or reduction of the
productivity of the big game prey population has occurred and may
result in a significant reduction in the allowable human harvest of
the population; and
(3) enhancement of abundance or productivity of the big game prey
population is feasibly achievable utilizing recognized and prudent
active management techniques.
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considered to be high enough to meet human consumptive needs,
the State may not respond by curbing harvest levels or taking other
conservation measures unless intensive management practices are
42
simultaneously implemented.
The statutory definition of “intensive management” is:
[M]anagement of an identified big game prey population
consistent with sustained yield through active management
measures to enhance, extend, and develop the population to
maintain high levels or provide for higher levels of human
harvest, including control of predation and prescribed or
43
planned use of fire and other habitat improvement techniques.

There can be no doubt that this definition, and the statutory goals
in general, are likely to lead to high levels of human intervention in
order to achieve a high level of consistent human consumptive use.
After all, “intensive management” is intended to maintain a
“sustained yield,” which the statute itself defines as “the
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of the ability to
support a high level of human harvest of game, subject to
preferences among beneficial uses, on an annual or periodic
44
basis.”
Furthermore, under the regulations that implement this
statute, the State uses the level of hunter demand for big game prey
as one of the four criteria to be used when “identifying big game
prey populations that are important for providing high levels of
45
human consumptive use.” In order to implement the Intensive
Management statute, the State has crafted regulations that require
the Board of Game to “utilize active management of habitat and
predation as the major tools to reverse any significant reduction in

42. Section 16.05.255(f) reads as follows:
The Board of Game may not significantly reduce the taking of an
identified big game prey population by adopting regulations relating to
restrictions on harvest or access to the population, or to management of
the population by customary adjustments in seasons, bag limits, open and
closed areas, methods and means, or by other customary means
authorized under (a) of this section, unless the board has adopted
regulations, or has scheduled for adoption at the next regularly
scheduled meeting of the board regulations, that provide for intensive
management to increase the take of the population for human harvest
consistent with (e) of this section.
This rule may not apply if the Board of Game determines that intensive
management would be ineffective, inappropriate, or against the best interest of
subsistence users. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(f) (2006).
43. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(j)(4) (2006).
44. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(j)(5) (2006) (emphasis added).
45. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 92.106(1)(D) (1998).
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the allowable human harvest of the population.”46 The
implementing regulations continue to underscore the humancentered, utilitarian goals of the statute and the high degree of
manipulation of wildlife systems that is required in order to achieve
those wildlife management goals.
If a hunting quota cannot be met in a game management area,
47
then intensive management methods must be put into place.
Predator control is the most easily identified method of intensive
management, though it is generally not permitted on NPS or U.S.
48
Practicing “intensive
Fish and Wildlife Service lands.
management” does not just consist of predator control, although
this is the utmost manifestation of the principle. Intensive
management in practice also includes actions such as: increasing
bag limits and liberalizing hunting seasons for predators to increase
their harvest; eliminating the need for hunters to obtain or
purchase hunting tags or permits for predators, thereby permitting
the “incidental” taking of these animals; authorizing same day
airborne hunting and trapping, which allow takings the same day
one flies in an aircraft; allowing easier and greater use of motor
vehicles while hunting, thus increasing the hunter’s advantage;
expanding the allowable means and methods of hunting for
predators, like baiting or feeding, thereby creating additional
opportunities for taking; allowing the sale of raw hides and skulls,
49
thereby creating economic incentives for taking; and many others.
46. Id. at § 92.106(6) (emphasis added).
47. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006).
48. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, §§ 92.110, 92.115, 92.125 (2006); see
also MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 69 (“The Service does not
engage in activities to reduce the numbers of native species for the purpose of
increasing the numbers of harvested species (i.e., predator control), nor does the
Service permit others to do so on lands managed by the National Park Service.”).
49. For example, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, Summary of Actions,
Proposals No. 147, 148, and 223, passed February/March 2004, reauthorized the
brown bear tag fee exemption in Units 19D, 20D, and 20E, because “moose are
currently below their population or harvest objectives” and “tag fee exemptions
will encourage harvesting opportunistically associated with other hunting
practices.” ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 24, 38 (Feb.
26 – Mar. 10, 2004), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/
meetsum/2003_2004/g031004.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Feb./Mar.
2004]. Proposal No. 230, passed February/March 2004, increased the wolf hunting
season and bag limit in Unit 19 because this was “vital in reducing the predator
population and helping to conserve the moose population.” Id. at 40. Proposal
No. 34, passed November 2005, lengthened the brown bear season in Unit 22A
because “bear predation . . . is contributing to a serious decline in moose
population.” ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 9 (Nov. 11
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Such yearly changes to hunting regulations apply to all hunters
within the game management unit (or sometimes statewide) on all
state, private, or (most) federal land, unless a specific exception is
50
written into the regulations. These regulatory changes are not
considered predator control activities—which may only be
executed by those specifically permitted to do predator control.
Also, the Intensive Management statute does not just affect Alaska
Board of Game decisions once populations are in decline; rather, it
is the state’s wildlife management mandate in the same way that
51
sections 802 and 815 of ANILCA and section 1 of the Organic
52
Act form the management mandate for the NPS in Alaska. All
state wildlife management activities carried out by the Board of
Game must be driven by the goals and directives of the Intensive
Management statute or the Board risks violating its legislatively
prescribed responsibilities.
Furthermore, intensive management is really an umbrella term
that describes several different types of management activities.
Within this category are those management actions already

– 14, 2005), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/
2005_2006/summ112005.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Nov. 2005].
Proposal No. 21, passed January 2006, allowed the trapping of black bear and the
sale of hides and skulls. “Board members felt that allowing the sale of hides
provides an opportunity to increase harvest in predator control areas.” ALASKA
DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 4 (Jan. 27 – 29, 2006), available at
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/2005_2006/jan06-bogstatewide.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Jan. 2006]. Proposal No. 29,
passed March 2006, eliminated brown bear tag fees in Unit 25C. “Adopting this
proposal is consistent with the intensive management goals for the Fortymile
caribou herd. Eliminating bear tag fees is another way of encouraging more
brown bear harvest.” ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 5
(Mar. 10 – 21, 2006 ), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/
meetsum/2005_2006/bog-march10sac.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Mar.
2006].
50. For instance, Proposal No. 6, passed November 2003, authorized the use of
“snowmachines” to take wolves in Unit 18, but the “board noted that this
regulation would not apply on federal [wildlife] refuge land.” ALASKA DEPT. OF
FISH AND GAME, Summary of Actions 2 (Nov. 1 – 4, 2003), available at
http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/gameinfo/meetsum/2003_2004/g110403.pdf.
[hereinafter Summary of Actions Nov. 2003]. State hunting rules do not
necessarily apply to subsistence hunters on federal lands in Alaska, unless the
federal subsistence board specifically adopts them because the federal government
controls all subsistence hunting on federal lands in Alaska. See generally DAVID
CASE and DAVID VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN LAWS, ch. 8 (2002).
51. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3112, 3125 (2000).
52. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
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described that are taken within official Intensive Management
Areas under the Intensive Management statute. But there are
identical types of actions taken on lands that are not officially
designated as Intensive Management Areas or actions intended to
promote prey species that are not officially recognized by the
53
While these management
Intensive Management statute.
practices are not a direct result of the Intensive Management
statute, they are nonetheless an intensive type of wildlife
management designed to increase selected prey populations for the
benefit of human hunters and to the detriment of natural
ecosystem dynamics.
IV. PREEMPTION: WHAT IS IT?
“When Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent
conflicting state legislation may be challenged via the Preemption
54
Doctrine.” In other words, state law must yield where it conflicts
with federal law. The concept of preemption is derived from the
55
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which requires that state

53. Proposal No. 51, passed March 2003, authorized an exemption for brown
bear tag fees in Unit 11 (which is not an Intensive Management Area within the
meaning of the Intensive Management statute). “The board recognized that the
tag fee exemptions were instituted to stimulate harvest [of brown bear] in
intensive management areas.” ALASKA DEPT. OF FISH AND GAME, Summary of
Actions 8 (Mar. 7 – 15, 2003), available at http://www.boards.adfg.state.ak.us/
gameinfo/meetsum/2002_2003/g031503.pdf. [hereinafter Summary of Actions Mar.
2003]. Proposal No. 56, passed in March 2003, increased the bag limit and season
length for red fox in certain units. “The board understood this limited increase
could benefit those wanting to c[u]ll foxes . . . .” Id. (species which foxes prey
upon not targeted by the Intensive Management statute). Proposal No. 156,
passed March 2003, increased the hunting season and bag limits for coyote in
many units in part because the “board recognized the pressure on [Dall’s] sheep
and small game populations” due to coyote predation. Id. at 22. (Dall’s sheep are
not targeted by the Intensive Management statute). Proposal No. 20, passed
November 2003, increased the bag limit on wolves in Unit 23 (which is not an
Intensive Management Area within the meaning of the Intensive Management
statute) to twenty wolves per season. “The board determined an increased bag
limit would benefit moose populations . . . .” Summary of Actions Nov. 2003,
supra note 50, at 5.
54. JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, & J. NELSON YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267 (1978).
55. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
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laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law be
invalidated.56
Laws such as the Organic Act and ANILCA are passed by
Congress under the granted constitutional power of the Property
57
Clause. The landmark United States Supreme Court case
describing the federal government’s powers under the Property
Clause, specifically as they relate to wildlife, is Kleppe v. New
58
The Kleppe Court stated that “we have repeatedly
Mexico.
observed that the power over public land thus entrusted to
59
Congress is without limitations.” The Court ultimately found that
“the complete power that Congress has over public lands
necessarily includes the power to regulate and protect wildlife
60
living there.” Therefore, according to the Court, Congress retains
the power to enact legislation respecting federal lands pursuant to
the Property Clause, and when Congress does enact such
legislation, it “necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the
61
Supremacy Clause.”
Preemption has been clearly recognized by the United States
Supreme Court:
If Congress evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state
law falling within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not
entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question,
state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an

56. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2002). See also
North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983) (stating that state statutes
that are “plainly hostile to the interests of the United States” need not be
applied); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824) (holding that “to such acts of
the State Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but . . . interfere with, or
are contrary to the law of Congress, made in pursuance of the Constitution. . . .
[i]n every such case, the act of Congress . . . is supreme; and the law of the State,
though enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.”). See
also NOWAK, ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 267 (“The supremacy
clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts any state regulation
where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation such that both
cannot stand . . . .”).
57. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“Congress shall have Power to dispose of
and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States.”).
58. 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
59. Id. at 539 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)).
60. Id. at 540–41 (internal quotations omitted).
61. Id. at 543.
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obstacle to the accomplishment
of the full purposes and
62
objectives of Congress.

Thus, a state statute may be preempted either because
congressional legislation completely occupies a given field so that
there is no room for state action, or because, although Congress
left room for the state to legislate, the state’s legislation directly
conflicts with the federal statute.
In the case of park wildlife management, Congress has not
expressly preempted state law. There is no clause in ANILCA or
the Organic Act that explicitly asserts that state law no longer
applies in the area of wildlife management. In fact, to the contrary,
these statutes are explicit that where there is no conflict, state law
regarding wildlife management is to remain in effect or is at least to
63
be given serious consideration. For these reasons it can also be
said that Congress did not intend for the statutes to completely
64
occupy the field of wildlife management. There is clearly room
created by Congress under these statutes for the states to continue
to legislate.
Here, Alaska state law and federal law directly conflict with
each other; in this scenario, state law must yield to the federal law.
“State action must give way to federal legislation where a valid act
of Congress fairly interpreted is in actual conflict with the law of
the state. Regulations duly promulgated by a federal agency,
pursuant to Congressional delegation, have the same preemptive

62. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987)
(internal citations and quotations omitted) (quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984)) (holding that state mining permit requirement
was not preempted because the federal land use and state environmental
regulations in question were distinguishable). See also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v.
Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851 (9th Cir. 2002) (“First, Congress may expressly preempt
state law. Second, preemption may be inferred where Congress has occupied a
given field with comprehensive regulation. Third, a state law is preempted to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.”); Totemoff v. State, 905 P.2d 954,
958 (Alaska 1995) (“Federal law can preempt state law in three ways. First,
Congress may expressly declare that state law is preempted. Second, state law is
preempted if Congress intends the federal government to occupy a field
exclusively. Third, federal law preempts state law if the two actually conflict.”).
63. See 16 U.S.C. § 1a-6(c)(2) (2000); 16 U.S.C. § 539b(c) (2000); see also 36
C.F.R. § 13.40 (1983) (adopting non-conflicting state laws into National Park
Service regulations).
64. See Totemoff, 905 P.2d at 959 (“Even though Title VIII [of ANILCA] has
been fully implemented, it does not create a scheme of federal regulation so
pervasive that there is no room for state regulation to supplement it.”).
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effect.”65 Therefore, if a statute passed by Congress is based on
legitimate constitutional authority, like the Property Clause, then
the derivative agency regulations interpreting that statute may also
66
preempt conflicting state law.
Also, state and federal laws need not be contradictory on their
face for federal law to supersede state law; on the contrary, actual
67
conflict may be far more subtle. Direct conflict can be found
where, for instance, the result of a state law is to manifestly
discourage the very conduct that federal law was meant to
encourage or if the state law encourages conduct that is
68
detrimental to the implementation of federal law.
As shall be seen, it is physically impossible to meet the goals of
69
both the federal and Alaska state statutes simultaneously;
furthermore, the state statute operates as an obstacle to the
70
accomplishment of Congress’s objectives as prescribed in
ANILCA and other statutes. For these reasons, which the next
Part will explain more fully, it is clear that the State’s Intensive
Management statute, as well as other intensive management

65. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-26, at 482 (2d
ed. 1988) (internal quotations omitted).
66. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
713, 714 (1985) (stating that “state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations
as well as by federal statutes,” but holding that local ordinances were not
preempted when there was no evidence that federal regulations explicitly or
implicitly intended to preempt local regulations in the field of plasma donation).
67. TRIBE, supra note 65, at 482.
68. See generally TRIBE, supra note 65, at 482–86. See also Nash v. Fla.
Industrial Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 239–40 (1967) (holding that state unemployment
compensation laws were preempted because they tended to defeat the objectives
of the NLRB); Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, Tex., 459 U.S. 145, 153–54 (1982)
(striking down a state tax because it would penalize the acts a federal law meant to
encourage); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973) (holding a city ordinance to be preempted because it mandated restrictions
that interfered with the accomplishment of the objectives of the Federal
Aeronautics Act).
69. See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 851–52 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“Such a conflict arises when compliance with both federal and state regulations is
a physical impossibility.” (quoting Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713) (internal
quotations omitted)); see also Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 581 (1987).
70. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (observing that state law is
preempted where it would stand “as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress”); see also Cal. Coastal,
480 U.S. at 581; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).

01__LURMAN_RABINOWITCH.DOC

162

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/17/2007 11:27:33 AM

[24:145

activities not specifically carried out under the Intensive
Management statute, are preempted on NPS lands.
V. PREEMPTION - WHY DOES IT APPLY?
The State of Alaska is pursuing a course of action that directly
interferes with the successful execution of congressional mandates
for the management of wildlife on NPS lands. It is not surprising
that conflict should arise between the State and the NPS over the
State’s game management activities. This is generally considered a
71
likely point of contention. NPS policy seeks to sustain and protect
natural populations and processes while avoiding artificial
manipulation that increases the numbers of certain species above
72
natural levels. The Alaska Board of Game, like most state game
73
authorities, is charged with maintaining high, continuously
74
rather than with
predictable numbers of prey populations,
maintaining the naturally fluctuating populations and processes
that the NPS is charged with protecting. This significant difference
in management goals was even recognized by the State of Alaska
and preserved in the Master Memorandum of Understanding
75
between the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the NPS.
That document states that the Department of Fish and Game
agrees, among other things:
1.

2.

To recognize the Service’s responsibility to conserve fish and
wildlife and their habitat and regulate the human use on Service
lands in Alaska, in accordance with the National Park Service
Organic Act, ANILCA, and other applicable laws.
To manage fish and resident wildlife populations in their natural
species diversity on Service lands, recognizing that
nonconsumptive use and appreciation by the visiting public is a
primary factor.
...

71. See Buono, supra note 37, at 22 (1997); William F. Porter & H. Brian
Underwood, Of Elephants and Blind Men: Deer Management in the U.S. National
Parks, 9 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 3, 5 (1999); supra note 20, at 32.
72. See MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006, supra note 15, at 62.
73. See generally Porter & Underwood, supra note 71, at 5 (“States are
charged with managing population size rather than population process.”); Wright,
supra note 20, at 32 (“State wildlife agencies typically manage for population size
and quality (e.g., large trophy males), whereas the NPS has no overt management
emphasis other than assuring that populations are free of unwarranted unnatural
disturbances.”).
74. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006).
75. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 4.
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To recognize that National Park Service areas were established,
in part, to “assure continuation of the natural process of
biological succession” and “to maintain the environmental
76
integrity of the natural features found in them.”

Conserving natural and healthy populations is requisite to
conserving wild species in their natural diversity to ensure natural
77
There can be no doubt that this was
biological succession.
Congress’s mandate for the NPS lands. However, this management
approach directly conflicts with the State’s actions and so ought to
preempt them.
Over time, the preemption cases “have continually narrowed
the scope of judicial inquiry to a determination of whether, under
the particular facts of the case, the existence of the state regulatory
scheme is facilitative or detrimental to the purposes and objectives
78
of the federal statute.” In other words, there is no hard and fast
rule as to whether a state statute must be preempted, but rather the
decision will depend upon the facts of the individual case.
The Intensive Management statute on its face conflicts with
federal laws that specifically promote conservation of natural
processes and natural and healthy populations. ANILCA
specifically provides permission for wildlife to be removed from
79
NPS lands through subsistence and sport hunting. While hunting
is permitted in some parks, it has never been implied that hunting
should trump the central purpose of the NPS, which is conservation
80
In fact, the opposite is true. ANILCA
in a natural state.
76. Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, both parties mutually agreed:
4. To recognize that the taking of fish and wildlife by hunting,
trapping, or fishing on certain [Park] Service lands in Alaska is
authorized in accordance with applicable State and Federal law
unless State regulations are found to be incompatible with
documented Park or Preserve goals, objectives or management
plans.
5. To recognize for maintenance, rehabilitation, and enhancement
purposes, that under extraordinary circumstances the
manipulation of habitat or animal populations may be an
important tool of fish and wildlife management to be used
cooperatively on Service lands and waters in Alaska by the
Service or the Department when judged by the Service, on a case
by case basis, to be consistent with applicable law and Park Service
policy.”
Id. (emphasis added).
77. See generally M. BEGON, ET AL., ECOLOGY: INDIVIDUALS, POPULATIONS
AND COMMUNITIES (1990).
78. NOWAK, ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 54, at 269.
79. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3126(a), 3202(c)(1) (2000).
80. See 16 U.S.C. § 410hh (2000) (establishing that subsistence activities are
“permitted” in certain park areas, but are not a purpose of those areas).
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specifically includes a mechanism through which all hunting,
including subsistence hunting, may be reduced or eliminated to
81
protect wildlife populations, but there is no corresponding
mechanism to artificially inflate prey numbers in order to protect
hunting, subsistence or otherwise. Subsistence hunting, for rural
82
Alaska residents in particular, must be accommodated, but even
that must give way where animal population numbers cannot
support it. The only solution to such a situation found in the
statute is to stop or reduce the hunt, not to intensively manage the
83
wildlife. Hunting, even subsistence hunting, may not be the driver
for wildlife management within the park system. Neither the NPS
nor a state has the authority to undermine the wildlife management
mandate for the parks determined by Congress. NPS wildlife may
84
only be managed for natural and healthy populations, not to
85
“achieve human consumptive use goals.”
In addition to this facial conflict between the statutes, the state
statute conflicts with the federal law as it is applied. As was
pointed out in Part III of this Article, Alaska’s Intensive
Management statute not only countenances but requires significant
alterations to natural population dynamics, often by facilitating the
elimination of large numbers of the predator species. The hunting
regulations that make this possible are applied throughout the
game management unit to which they are attached. For instance,
Proposals No. 148 and 223, which were passed during the
February/March 2004 Board of Game meeting, and which
reauthorized the brown bear tag fee exemption in units 19D and
86
20E, necessarily affected parts of Yukon-Charley Rivers National
Preserve and Denali National Preserve, as well as other federal
87
lands that happen to be in those units. Similarly, Proposal No. 19,
which was passed in November 2003, and which eliminated the

81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126(b) (2000).
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 3113 (2000).
83. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 3114, 3126 (2000); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628
F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1986). In National Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, the court stated that
“the primary management function with respect to Park wildlife is its preservation
unless Congress has declared otherwise.” Id. at 912. In addition, Secretary
Hubert Work emphasized that “the duty imposed upon the National Park Service
in the organic act creating it to faithfully preserve the parks and monuments for
posterity in essentially their natural state is paramount to every other activity.” Id.
at 910 (emphasis added).
84. See 16 U.S.C. § 3125 (2000).
85. ALASKA STAT. § 16.05.255(e) (2006).
86. Summary of Actions Feb./Mar. 2004, supra note 49, at 24, 38.
87. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 80–88.
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resident tag fee for brown bear in unit 23,88 affected Gates of the
89
Arctic National Preserve and Noatak National Preserve. Proposal
No. 120, which was passed in March 2006, extended the wolf
hunting season for units 12, 20, and 25, in order to “help increase
90
moose numbers.” This regulation affects Denali National
Preserve, Yukon-Charley Rivers National Preserve, and Wrangell91
St. Elias National Preserve.
Wildlife managers cannot strive to maximize prey for human
consumption while simultaneously conserving natural and healthy
populations of all species. The two goals and the means by which
they are achievable are mutually exclusive. The goals and methods
of the Intensive Management statute have manifested themselves
in a multitude of actions, described above, which attempt to
manipulate wildlife, often at the expense of predator populations.
It is clear that both federal and state entities recognize that outright
92
predator control is inappropriate on NPS lands. It should now be
apparent as well that the many actions in addition to actual
predator control under the Intensive Management statute
inherently conflict with federal law and should be prohibited from
93
being executed on NPS lands.
There is a series of United States Supreme Court cases which
hold that general statutory expressions of national policy are not
necessarily sufficient to result in statutory conflict leading to
preemption; rather, specific federal declarations are often
94
required. In Commonwealth Edison v. Montana, the Court stated
88. Summary of Actions Nov. 2003, supra note 50, at 5.
89. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 96–98.
90. Summary of Actions Mar. 2006, supra note 49, at 18.
91. 2007–2008 ALASKA HUNTING REGULATIONS, supra note 4, at 61–62, 83–88,
102–04.
92. See Letter from Marcia Blaszak, Regional Director, National Park Service,
to Mike Fleagle, Chairman, Alaska Board of Game (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with
author) (stating that, in the past, National Park Service lands have been
specifically excluded by the Alaska Board of Game from predator control areas).
93. Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Fish Wildlife and Parks,
Department of the Interior, to Gerald Nicholia, Chair, Eastern Interior Alaska
Subsistence Regional Advisory Council (Dec. 15, 2006) (on file with author)
(stating that predator control in particular and manipulation of wildlife
populations in general is “contrary to the National Park Service concept”).
94. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 435 U.S. 609, 634 (1981)
(holding that Montana’s severance tax on coal did not violate the Supremacy
Clause because general expressions by Congress that the use of coal is favored
over other fossil fuels are not sufficient to preempt a state law that might burden
that goal); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 220–23 (1983) (rejecting the claim that California’s
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that “it is necessary to look beyond general expressions of ‘national
policy’ to specific federal statutes with which the state law is
95
claimed to conflict.” In that case, utility companies sued the State
of Montana, arguing that the State’s severance tax on coal is
preempted by several federal statutes which encourage the use of
96
The Court, however, noted that
coal over other fossil fuels.
Congress specifically provided for the continuation of state
severance taxes on coal in the savings clauses of the relevant
statutes, and the legislative history demonstrates that Congress
contemplated Montana’s severance tax specifically when writing
97
those clauses.
In Alaska, however, the facts surrounding the management of
wildlife indicate that the exact opposite is true. The savings clauses
in ANILCA explicitly recognize that section VIII of the statute
98
changes federal and state roles regarding wildlife management.
Also, the legislative history emphasizes Congress’s desire to ensure
that agencies manage wildlife strictly to maintain healthy and
natural populations and, furthermore, notes the NPS’s pre-existing
conservation mission and recognizes that the NPS, and the Fish and
Wildlife Service in particular, may need to develop more stringent
99
wildlife protection regulations. In the statutes themselves, and in
the legislative history, Congress never contemplates the use of
alternative goals and methods for wildlife management on NPS
lands, though Congress was likely aware that such alternatives
were in place in many state systems.
100
The case of Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul
suggests, however, that differing statutory goals alone may not
suffice to be the basis for preemption. In that case, Florida farmers
sued the State of California over a California statute which limited
the avocados that could be sold in California to those containing
less than eight percent oil, even though a federal statute already
101
created guidelines for the sale of avocados. The Court found that
preemption did not apply because the California statute did not

moratorium on new nuclear power plants frustrates the Atomic Energy Act’s
purpose to encourage the commercial use of nuclear power).
95. 453 U.S. at 634.
96. Id. at 633.
97. Id. at 635.
98. 16 U.S.C. § 3202 (2000).
99. S. REP. NO. 96-413, at 233 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5070,
5177.
100. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
101. Id. at 133–34.
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directly conflict with the federal statute.102 The state statute
adopted oil percentage requirements and the federal statute
adopted picking date, weight, and size restrictions; therefore the
requirements of both regulatory schemes could be met
103
Ultimately,
simultaneously and preemption was not necessary.
the Court said that the “test of whether both federal and state
regulations may operate, or the state regulation must give way, is
whether both regulations can be enforced without impairing the
federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at
104
similar or different objectives.” As has already been pointed out,
the objectives of the statutes in question in this Article are in fact
105
“quite dissimilar” and the perpetuation of the State’s regime
must come at the expense of the federal goals. Here, the goals do
not simply differ; rather, the State scheme interferes with NPS
Management, since wildlife populations that are regularly
manipulated are not natural.
Human manipulation of wildlife populations may very well
lead to unnatural or unhealthy conditions for those populations.
For instance, if predator populations are artificially suppressed to
increase prey populations, those prey populations can become so
overabundant that they destroy the very environment upon which
106
they depend. Of course, a superficial response to this problem is

102. Id. at 141.
103. Id. at 142–43.
104. Id. at 142.
105. Id.
106. See William J. Ripple et al., Trophic Cascades Among Wolves, Elk and
Aspen on Yellowstone National Park’s Northern Range, 102 BIOLOGICAL
CONSERVATION 227, 228 (2001) (describing how elk overbrowsing has contributed
to a great decline in aspen regeneration in Yellowstone National Park and
suggesting that it was the extirpation of wolves that led to changed elk patterns of
movement through the park, which led to this situation). The authors also suggest
that the reintroduction of wolves to the park may be reversing this process. Id.
See also FREDERIC WAGNER ET AL., WILDLIFE POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL
PARKS 46–47 (1995) (“Even the most superficial review of animal problems in the
parks reveals that overpopulations [of ungulates] are at the root of many
difficulties . . . . The more complex policy question to resolve once more turns on
the matter of naturalness. The ecosystems in parks primarily established for their
preservation . . . are clearly being altered by the browsing of elevated deer
populations.”). Wagner and his co-authors cite “the following generalizations
about the effects of high deer densities in eastern U.S. deciduous forests:”
[C]omposition of the forest overstory may be determined by browsing
out the saplings of palatable tree species and leaving the unpalatable
species to dominate the forest; the composition of the understory may be
determined in the same way and, at the extreme, eliminated . . . .

01__LURMAN_RABINOWITCH.DOC

168

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/17/2007 11:27:33 AM

[24:145

simply to argue that hunters will replace predators in this new
version of an ecosystem and prey numbers will be kept in check.
However, while hunting may prevent the problems related to
ungulate overabundance, it can still lead to unnatural conditions.
Suppressed or absent predator populations, even if nominally
replaced by humans who cull large ungulates, will still lead to
altered cascading trophic effects (i.e., changes in what is present to
107
eat and be eaten will be felt up and down the food chain). An
oversimplified example of such unnatural consequences may be
that decreased wolf populations lead to increased coyote
populations, which lead to decreased fox populations—each
change causing many other changes in related prey populations
108
(e.g., rodents, other small mammals, and birds). It is impossible
to manipulate one end of a trophic system (or ecosystem) without
causing a chain reaction of other unnatural and often unpredictable
results.
The intensive management situation is very similar to First
109
Iowa Hydroelectric Cooperative v. Federal Power Commission,
where a utility cooperative’s application for a license to build a
dam was blocked by the State of Iowa for failure to comply with
Iowa law, although the application met all the requirements of the
110
The Court stated that, “[c]ompliance with
Federal Power Act.
State requirements that are in conflict with federal requirements

Fundamental changes in vegetation alter the abundance and diversity of
animal species that depend on it.
Id. (internal quotations omitted); Douglas W. Smith, Rolf Peterson & Douglas B.
Houston, Yellowstone After Wolves, 53 BIOSCIENCE 330, 331 (2003) (finding that
once grey wolves were extirpated from Yellowstone National Park in the early
1930s “some ungulate species, particularly elk, were considered to be
‘overabundant’ and ‘range deterioration’ became an issue”).
107. See GARY K. MEFFE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 392
(2d ed. 1997) (“Management of single species can lead to maximizing production
of a few species without regard to the community/ecosystem in which they occur.
Achieving high densities for one species may cause serious habitat degradation
and reduce biodiversity.”).
108. See generally Smith, Peterson & Houston, supra note 106, at 335–38
(finding generally that wolf reintroduction to the park has resulted in a fifty
percent decline in coyote density; because red fox compete closely with coyote
their numbers may increase; wolverine populations may also increase because
they rely on scavenging carcasses which are now more abundant due to wolf
predation; willow and aspen, which had been rare prior to wolf reintroduction, are
now increasing and are important for many bird and small mammal species, as
well as beaver and moose).
109. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
110. Id. at 156–64.
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may well block the federal license.”111 Ultimately, the Court found
that the State’s laws were preempted and stated that:
The Act leaves to the states their traditional jurisdiction subject
to the admittedly superior right of the Federal Government,
through Congress, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce,
administer the public lands and reservations of the United States
and, in certain cases, exercise authority under the treaties of the
United States. These sources of constitutional authority are all
applied in the Federal Power Act to the development of the
112
navigable waters of the United States.

Similarly, the Organic Act and the ANILCA leave to the State of
Alaska its traditional power to regulate wildlife as long as that
power is not used in ways that conflict with the federal
government’s superior right to regulate its lands. It is important to
keep in mind that:
Where Congress has legislated in a field traditionally occupied
by the states . . . there is a presumption against preemption, and
a finding of preemption requires a ‘clear and manifest’
Congressional purpose . . . . [F]ederal courts can be expected to
take a close look to determine whether preemption is consistent
113
with what appears to be the Congressional purpose.

It is true that wildlife management is an area of law typically
left to state control, but it is also true that under the Property
Clause of the Constitution the federal government has the right to
114
“State
legislate concerning its land and the wildlife thereon.
action incompatible with a legitimate exercise of federal power
lacks validity, even when within an area where the states might
115
Ultimately, if the Property Clause and the
otherwise act.”
Supremacy Clause are to be given full effect, federal laws must
trump state law even in the area of wildlife management. As the

111. Id. at 167.
112. Id. at 171–72.
113. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE – AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, FEDERAL PREEMPTION: A BRIEF
ANALYSIS 7 (Aug. 26, 1999).
114. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (“Unquestionably the
States have broad trustee and police powers over wild animals within their
jurisdictions.”); see also Fund for Animals v. Thomas, 932 F. Supp. 368, 369–70
(D.D.C. 1996) (“The common law has always regarded the power to regulate the
taking of animals ferae naturae to be vested in the states to the extent their
exercise of that power may not be incompatible with, or restrained by, the rights
conveyed to the Federal government by the Constitution.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
115. NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN,
UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 1999).
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Supreme Court said in Hines v. Davidowitz,116 where the state’s law
stands as “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
117
full purposes and objectives of Congress,” it must be preempted.
This is the case at hand. The goal of the Intensive
Management statute, to maintain an artificially high level of prey
animals in order to meet the needs of all hunters in the state, is
completely incongruous to the goals of the Organic Act and the
ANILCA, which are to maintain natural and healthy populations
and processes. Therefore, regulations enacted by the State which
directly affect NPS lands, in order to meet or further the goals of
the Intensive Management statute, are likely to discourage,
complicate, or thwart the NPS’s ability to meet the goals of the
Organic Act and the ANILCA.
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been clear for some time that NPS regulations may
preempt state wildlife management laws that conflict with the
NPS’s own mandates at any time under the Organic Act. What is
now also clear is that Alaska’s Intensive Management statute meets
the criteria for direct conflict with federal law, specifically the
Organic Act and the ANILCA, as well as derivative regulations
and policies, and must be preempted in favor of wildlife
management goals and techniques that are in line with the
mandates established by Congress.
While this article may appear to support an enormous shift in
responsibility among federal and state managers, in fact the
balance of power remains the same. Congress never suggested that
it would tolerate the co-existence of state laws that thwarted its
own legislative intent. This is necessarily a fact-specific analysis;
different state wildlife management regimes might yield very
different results.
We do not mean to imply that intensive management practices
are normatively bad or wrong in some philosophical sense. The
State has every right to manage wildlife for abundance of key
species, and, by doing so, is meeting the needs and desires of many
residents. Unfortunately, such management techniques and goals,
while perfectly legitimate on state and private lands, are neither
appropriate nor legal on NPS lands, which are required to be
managed for purposes other than maximized human consumptive
uses. Reconciling these two disparate systems is not a matter of

116. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
117. Id. at 67 (emphasis added).
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determining who is right and who is wrong.118 Instead, it is a matter
of determining on which lands these practices are allowed by law
and on which lands they are not.

118. Porter & Underwood, supra note 71, at 5.

